This work argues that agentic risk is progressive: it can enter at four loci of the agent control loop--skill admission, invocation-time intent, execution-time effect, and post-action consequence--while a denied dangerous objective can reappear across surface forms, tools, or turns.
Abstract
As large language model (LLM) agents move from conversation to executing code, reading local files, and orchestrating external tools, a single agent hijacked by a malicious third-party skill can cause data exfiltration, privilege escalation, or cascading compromise. We argue that agentic risk is progressive: it can enter at four loci of the agent control loop--skill admission, invocation-time intent, execution-time effect, and post-action consequence--while a denied dangerous objective can reappear across surface forms, tools, or turns; existing safeguards are typically local to one lifecycle boundary or one call. Guided by this threat model, we present ClawSentry, an open-source, framework-agnostic security supervision gateway for agent runtimes. Before a skill package is ever executed, First-use Skill Package Review (FSPR) audits it under a deterministic evidence floor, escalating unresolved cases to bounded read-only agentic review (locus A). At runtime, a three-tier progressive decision engine--a deterministic L1 layer, a rule-anchored L2 semantic reviewer, and a read-only L3 evidence-seeking agent--spends contextual review only on the residual ambiguity, while a session-level anti-bypass mechanism recognizes tool-switching and rephrased retries (loci B--C); a post-action path feeds high-severity evidence non-retroactively into later review (locus D). An Agent Harness Protocol (AHP) abstraction applies one policy across Codex, Claude Code, Kimi CLI, and Gemini CLI without modifying agent internals. On SkillInject with Codex/GPT-5.4, contextual ASR falls from 39.55% to 2.61% while contextual TSR moves only from 83.78% to 83.05%. Across five Work Agents on the full SkillsSafety benchmark, ClawSentry confines ASR to 9.09--15.03% from 33.5--49.7% unprotected, and aggregate TSR on clean skills remains 98.7%.
A four-layer taxonomy mapping 13 vulnerability types across perception, brain, action, and interaction layers is contributed, and seven open problems centered on containment are identified.
Md Jafrin Hossain, Mohammad Arif Hossain, Nirwan Ansari· 0 citations
This paper introduces a compositional model explaining why no component is catastrophic alone, yet their conjunction can produce correlated destructive action, and separates three population-reach routes from a common core of dormancy, activation, authority, reachable targets, and failed recovery.
A four-dimensional Integration Friction Index is introduced that separates one-time engineering cost from recurring organisational, legal, and maintenance cost and shows why scope and budget enforcement cannot be delegated to system prompts.
Israt Moyeen Noumi, Tarannum Ahmed Nowshin, Md. Mehedi Hasan Bhuiyan Nipu et al.· 0 citations
Large language model (LLM) agents in governed organizations must let the persona (instructions, tone, self-presentation) evolve freely, while keeping execution (stateful, audited work) traceable. A single trust domain does not satisfy both cheaply. We present Persona-Execution Separation (PES): persona and execution reside in different trust domains, connected by a governed contract bridge. The persona is singly-homed and may drift; execution is faceless and audited. Status summaries may return; data bodies remain in the restrictive domain except a graded data-loss-prevention (DLP) exception; identity stays continuous. An approval matrix, DLP, and audit enforce the crossing. PES follows from three goals---free drift, execution traceability, and decoupling. Under LLM representational indistinguishability, any single-domain mechanism that meets all three must re-introduce typed change objects, an external gate, and a stable audit anchor: PES rebuilt at higher coupling cost. A development/pilot case in a regulated digital-employee platform records five decisions over one month, each with a rejected alternative. A mechanism check on the shipped implementation found no execution-side re-validation under persona perturbation (five model configurations) and no persona fingerprint on hard-asserted fields. A probe of a recovered pre-separation build found the governed execution path decoupled from the persona by omission, not by construction; a later wiring change could reverse that isolation, which PES makes an audited architectural rule. The pattern applies when multi-user deployment, execution audit, and expected persona churn hold jointly.
This paper presents ToolGuardian, a policy-driven framework for securing agent-tool interactions through pre-admission vetting and task-aware runtime authorization, and compares ASP against heuristic and LLM-based policy realizations using identical inputs and output contracts.
TokenWall is proposed, a runtime defense framework that acts as a semantic firewall over agent token flows, demonstrating that semantic runtime containment can achieve a practical security-utility trade-off for persistent AI agents.
Puji Wang, Yingchen Zhang, Ruqing Zhang et al.· 1 citation
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