: Modal essentialism holds that some x is essentially F if and only if at every possible world at which x exists, x is F . This view entails (ignoring the case of extreme essentialism) that distinct possible worlds can represent de re (singular) possibilities for the same individual. In the literature we find haecceiti...
Many philosophers have argued that the orthodox analysis of epistemic-modal sentences, on which such sentences assert facts about what is compatible with some contextually given informational state, is fatally flawed. As an alternative, some have suggested a nonfactualist reading of such sentences. On this reading, u...
Carnap [5] in 1943 noticed that there exist some non-normal valuations that do not respect the usual truth conditions of classical connectives, yet are sound. This finding reveals an asymmetry between the syntax and semantics of classical logic and might be counted as a challenge to the inferentialist program. While se...
J. Jafari, Davood Hosseini· Australasian Journal of Logi...· 0 citations
In this paper I discuss an initially very plausible principle about metaphysical explanation, which has recently been explicitly defended. Suppose some q metaphysically explains the metaphysical necessity of p. Does q then also metaphysically explain p’s truth? The principle at issue, call it ‘(NT)’, gives an affirmati...
The syntactic interpretation of mathematics (SIM) refers to the view that interprets mathematical propositions as true expressions solely by virtue of the syntactical conventions governing the use of those expressions and not by corresponding to objective mathematical facts. This view, exemplified by the Vienna Circl...
Long Chen· Theoria· 0 citations
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