A mechanism in which a language model maps actions to plain-language consequence categories with user-authored"allow","ask", or"never"rules is examined, and a gap between preference and commitment is revealed: repeatedly choosing "ask" preserves case-by-case choice but prevents a standing policy from settling decisions in advance.
Abstract
AI agents are poised to become a primary interface to digital products, acting across email, files, payments, and personal data. People without professional software backgrounds need understandable, reusable ways to control actions across services. We examine a mechanism in which a language model maps actions to plain-language consequence categories with user-authored"allow","ask", or"never"rules. We ask what is gained and lost when decisions are made in advance as reusable rules rather than separately for each action. We analyzed 113 participants without professional software backgrounds across three conditions: per-action human-in-the-loop approval (HITL), automated per-action model review (AUTO), or user-authored consequence policy (POLICY). Participants judged 2 examples in each of 4 consequence categories; POLICY participants then set one rule per category. All supervised an 18-action simulated day, including 7 overreach actions. POLICY blocked less overreach than HITL (-20.1 percentage points, 95% CI [-32.1, -8.1]) and AUTO (-14.5 points, 95% CI [-25.8, -3.2]). POLICY lowered runtime prompts from 18.0 to 10.9, but total intervention time was not reliably lower when rule setup was included. Exploratory analysis showed that participants chose"ask"for 114 of 140 POLICY rules, returning most overreach actions to runtime. Of the 148 overreach actions executed in POLICY, 133 followed human approval and 15 ran automatically under"allow"rules. Across all 7 overreach actions, POLICY had the highest approval rate. Counterintuitively, user-authored rules did not by themselves provide stronger protection: many actions outside users'original requests went through after users approved them. These results reveal a gap between preference and commitment: repeatedly choosing"ask"preserves case-by-case choice but prevents a standing policy from settling decisions in advance.
This primer draws on fieldwork in a computational biology laboratory to examine what human oversight of AI agents requires in practice and shows that effective oversight has four components: adequate knowledge of system capabilities and limitations, sufficient observation of system actions, meaningful control of system behavior, and timely intervention in system failures.
HANDBOOK_md is presented, a benchmark of 65 agentic tasks modeled on how employees follow company handbooks, and every task modifies one of 10 base handbooks, altering the specific rules and thresholds on which grading depends, so no two tasks share the same set of policies.
Liudas Panavas, Sebastian Minus, Bradley Monton et al.· arXiv.org· 1 citation
A target-specific authorization audit is introduced that labels context factors separately for each tool and argument target and holds the task, proposition, position, and policy fixed while changing only the proposition's source authority.
Software developers increasingly delegate routine programming work to autonomous AI coding agents that read untrusted project files, run commands, and call external services with limited human review. No developer can audit every action such an agent takes, so oversight defaults to a single artifact: the summary the agent writes when it finishes. The completeness of that summary is a security property in its own right, yet current evaluations do not measure it. Existing benchmarks ask whether a malicious instruction planted in a repository succeeds in redirecting an agent. They do not ask whether the agent then discloses what it did.
This study takes up the second question. We instrument an open-source coding agent running against a controlled, sandboxed repository carrying an injected instruction, and establish per-trial ground truth on what the agent actually did from channels independent of its own account. The design covers nine models, with a second agent used to check that the effect reproduces. Setting that ground truth against the report the developer receives separates two behaviours that prior work has treated as one: whether an attack succeeds, and whether the agent discloses it.
In our data, resisting attack more often does not make a model more forthcoming when an attack does succeed. The two vary independently, so a benchmark scored on attack success alone cannot rank agents on the risk a developer actually carries. We find preliminary evidence that a single sentence added to the developer's own prompt substantially improves disclosure.Faculty Supervisor: Rongxing Lu
The right unit of safety in agentic AI is the trajectory-with-checkable-evidence, not the model, and this work formalizes an Agent Trajectory Schema and Evidence Chain, state a compositional gating proposition based on standard monitor composition, and outline a research agenda.
Albus W. Ng, Yibin Han, Jusheng Zhang et al.· 0 citations
Boundary-Bench is released, an open-source hardening plugin enabling policy-constrained evaluation of coding agents on Terminal-Bench and compatible benchmarks, and task solvability under the strictest policy is verified, separating model failures from tasks the policy forecloses.
Dotan Davidovich, Yair Amar, Hai Rozencwajg et al.· 0 citations
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