A local explanation method (LE) in explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) is basically a two-step procedure: first construct a naively explainable model approximating the black-box model in need of explanations; then extract an explanation from the approximate model and return it. The extracted explanation aims to be just analogous to the target explanation, suggesting that users should rely on analogical arguments to transfer certain properties observable on the former to the latter. In this article, assuming a hypothetical expert user whose knowledge satisfies certain conjectures, we reconstruct the structures ‘ reason therefore conclusion ’ of these analogical arguments and study conditions for ensuring the truth of the reason ; conditions for ensuring that the conclusion follows necessarily from the reason ; as well as counter-arguments the user has to consider. It is argued that the presented findings shed light on the internal reasoning of an expert user at the end of User–LE dialogue. On this basis, the article then pursues a computational argumentation-based approach to elevate existing system-centred LEs to user-centred XAI. Technically the paper develops an argumentation framework for the so-called Argumentative Local Explainers ( A r g L E ) which extend local explanation methods with the internal reasoning of a hypothetical expert user . Formally, we show that A r g L E can compute the expert user’s beliefs about the target explanation. It is envisioned that the integration of A r g L E and existing models of argumentation dialogues helps to create conversational agents that can guide non-expert users to receive system-centred XAI explanations in a way that expert users do.
This paper was written during the course “Introduction to Linguistic Theories and Analysis,” offered by the PPGL – Graduate Program in Linguistics at UFSCAR – Federal University of São Carlos, in February 2026. During the course, we had the opportunity to develop a paper, following the conclusion of the course, with the aim of defining the semantic fields of the two terms mentioned, as well as examining their use within the field of linguistics. Methodologically, the text is structured as a literature review of works addressing science, linguistics, and language, drawn from both physical and digital collections. The primary reference consulted in this approach is Karl Popper’s, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2013). As intended outcomes of this study, we hope to compile a set of arguments that will, in principle, serve to integrate some of the theoretical frameworks into our doctoral dissertation (in progress, UFSCAR, 2024-2028).
In argumentation theory, loci - also referred to as topoi - are commonly viewed as abstract sources of inference that guide the invention of arguments. Within the Argument Model of Topics (AMT), loci are analysed as sources of inference underlying individual arguments. This paper extends said view by arguing that loci perform a discourse-directive function beyond the level of individual arguments. This function is understood in an analytical sense and refers to how loci orient argumentative interaction by indicating the inferential relations along which issues become arguable in particular ways, such as procedural conditions, goals, constrained choices, conceptual boundaries, or source evaluation. Situated at the meso-level of analysis, this function exceeds the micro-level reconstruction of individual arguments while preceding the identification of recurring argumentative patterns at the macro-level. This paper shows how the reappearance of premises in extended debates, when repeatedly connected to conclusions through the same loci , recurrently instantiates the same inferential relations that orient argumentative interaction. These recurrent inferential relations do not themselves constitute argumentative patterns, but repetition makes these relations empirically traceable across argumentative contributions before the stabilization of argumentative patterns. The analytical framework is illustrated by examples from the controversy of nuclear energy production.
The dense passage in ‘On Denoting’, often called the Gray’s Elegy Argument, is directed against the view that each definite description is associated with two semantic items—what Bertrand Russell calls ‘meaning’ and ‘denotation’. It is possible to interpret the passage as a single, coherent argument against the view, if we attribute to him the notion that the relation of meaning to denotation must hold within what I call a multifaceted object. In this paper, I offer a sketch of the interpretation we can thus obtain, before I attempt to explicate the notion of multifaceted objects by offering a semantics for them. I illustrate some features of the semantics by showing that a version of many-sorted, intensional logic is sound and complete with respect to the semantics. I conclude the paper by presenting how the semantics can be used to interpret some remarks in the GEA.
This paper reconstructs, in a historical and critical perspective, the Brentanian project of a reform of logic and the bifurcation that emerges between Twardowski and Husserl. Against the widespread tendency to frame the Austro-Polish debates through the metaphysical opposition realism/idealism, it argues that the decisive issue concerns the constitution and scope of a formally sound yet epistemologically relevant logic. Building on Brentano's reduction of judgment to existential acceptance or rejection, the paper highlights how "modification" becomes the operator through which predicative judgments are transformed into existential form. It then examines Twardowski's theory of logical modification—grounded in the distinction between attributive and modifying adjectives and in the thesis that representation does not posit existence—and shows how this framework motivates his account of intentional (in-)existence and his stance on general objects. Husserl's critique, by contrast, relocates modification within a phenomenological theory of meaning and intentionality: nominalization, suppositio materialis, and especially neutralization articulate a layered system of logical and intentional modifications. The paper concludes that Husserl's reform opens a systematic place for modalizations (possibility, necessity, probability) as constitutive features of meaning and noematic content.
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