Jul 2026· Episteme· pp. 1-20· 0 citations· 19 references
Abstract
Consciousness-raising groups were an integral feature of the second wave feminist movement in the 1960s and 70s, and they are credited with finding a way to break through the epistemic barriers to a robust understanding of gender-based oppression. Consciousness-raising is therefore often used by feminist philosophers to explain how it is possible to arrive at knowledge about injustice and oppression in light of a variety of epistemic barriers. However, the process itself is rarely properly explored in its own right. It is therefore often unclear what it consists of and how it is meant to work. In this article, I seek to establish a philosophically rigorous account of consciousness-raising. I first unpack what consciousness-raising consisted in, as described and analysed by second-wave feminists. I then isolate what I take to be its core tenets and the mechanisms that render it a powerful epistemic tool. Then, I respond to two objections, namely the ‘intersectionality objection’ and the ‘bad company objection’, in order to further clarify what this method consists in and what its epistemic potential might be.
In this article I will try to show how phenomenological philosophy may come to terms with the predominant epistemological paradigm of our time in ways that analytic philosophy cannot do, especially by focusing on certain disciplines of natural science, primarily foundational mathematics (permitting this classification) and quantum physics. I note that logic, mathematics and physics may be considered as fundamental sciences in the Husserlian sense of being rational and explanatory enterprises that help clarify the sense of being-in-the-world. In putting up my arguments in this respect I have considered both the Husserlian transcendental phenomenology as a key component of my argumentation but also in a kind of juxtaposition Heidegger’s existential version, even as Husserl denounced it upon the appearance of Sein und Zeit as a kind of ‘anthropology’, to the extent that they both have as an ultimate line of convergence the reduction to a sort of transcendence of the self irreducible to objectivist, mundane terms. In this approach I take up the task to show that phenomenology in a more inclusive global sense is better qualified to accede to the ideal of a rigorous science insofar as it can set up a more reliable theoretical philosophical context to interpret ontological issues raised by modern epistemology.
Stathis Livadas· Principia: An International...· 0 citations
The article analyzes the key stages in the formation of the phenomenological theory of meaning, which has its roots in the philosophy of Franz Brentano. It examines Brentano’s critique of Aristotle’s formal-logical paradigm and his concept of intentionality as an essential characteristic of psychical phenomena. Special attention is paid to Brentano’s distinction between the act of presentation and the object of presentation, which lays the groundwork for the subsequent analysis of consciousness. The study substantiates a series of interconnected theses. Firstly, unlike Aristotle, Brentano identifies the pre-logical layer of consciousness — the psychical act of presentation that precedes any judgment and is responsible for the very constitution of objectivity. This act does not exist in the formal-logical sense since, by the time a judgment occurs, it has already taken place, leaving us only with its result; thus, intentionality resides in a kind of transcendental field in relation to formal logic. Secondly, the product of the intentional act is a unified presentation of the object — an objective unity constituted in psychical activity. This unity, being an inseparable correlate of the act of consciousness and its directedness toward an object, can justifiably be termed the immanent object. Thirdly, this immanent object, possessing a unity of meaning and serving as the subjective correlate of the real object, can be defined as the meaning of the object. While serving as the subject of predication in a judgment, it is itself formed in the process of meaning-constitution, which occurs prior to any logical predication. Taken together, these propositions lead to the conclusion that Brentano’s introduction of intentionality and his analysis of the structure of presentation lay the conceptual foundations for Edmund Husserl’s subsequent transition from descriptive psychology to transcendental phenomenology, which investigates the pure structures of consciousness and meaning-constitution.
Yegor A. Toroshchin· Вестник Пермского университе...· 0 citations
This Element brings three topics into closer contact: scepticism about the external world, the metaphysics of perception, and the epistemology of perception. It argues that a certain kind of response to external world scepticism is significantly stronger if we make certain theoretical commitments regarding the metaphysics and epistemology of perception. I argue that a neo-Moorean epistemological disjunctivist response to scepticism is much more compelling when underpinned by a naïve realist theory of perceptual phenomenal character and the transparency model of how we acquire knowledge of our perceptual states. The possibility that these theories are true radically alters the dialectical situation with respect to external world scepticism: the sceptical argument is on much shakier ground than is usually appreciated. Integrating our theorising about our knowledge of the external world and our theorising about the metaphysics and epistemology of perception affords a more comprehensive view of our anti-sceptical options.
This article explores the ecological crisis as a multidimensional phenomenon that engages humanity at an existential and therefore philosophical level. Starting from the recognition of the authentic human condition, as that of a being deeply rooted in an ecosystem whose balance sustains its well-being, it argues for moving beyond the anthropocentric fallacy that has driven humankind to pursue its dream of Promethean domination. Rather, the complex nature of the human being, at once biological and cultural, carries a message of universal solidarity. In ignoring this message, humanity has betrayed its true identity: that of a steward of life understood in its universal dimension. As a conscious part of nature, humanity is entrusted with caring for it, adopting a more-than-human ethics grounded in respect and love for the relationships that connect all things within the web of life. This calls for revisiting the anthropological question through a systemic lens, opening onto an alternative epistemological and ontological perspective, one that allows us to rethink humanity’s relationship with the entire ecosphere and imagine a different way of co-dwelling on Earth.
This article examines a context that is critical for understanding contemporary transformations in socio-cultural reality, with a particular focus on broadly understood educational practice. Specifically, it addresses dehumanization, and more precisely, the variant which may be called self-dehumanization. The analysis proceeds in two stages. First, the phenomenon of self-imposed dehumanisation is conceptualized using selected themes from the humanist tradition of mass society analysis (Znaniecki, Ortega y Gasset, Oakeshott, Sloterdijk). Second, the article poses a series of questions regarding the relationship between contemporary education and the core elements of self-dehumanization: the culture of cynicism, the ontology of ingratitude, intellectual-ethical inertia, and resentment. The discussion seeks to invite further examination of education as a potential environment for dehumanization and, above all, the tendency among educational actors toward self-degradation, a topic that remains underexplored in pedagogical theory and is often overlooked in educational practice.
Krzysztof Maliszewski· Nauki o Wychowaniu Studia In...· 0 citations
Both Marxist standpoint theory, and decolonial epistemologies ground knowledge claims in embodied experience, particularly the experience of oppressed groups. Central to both traditions is the concept of epistemic privilege: the thesis that marginalized positions (the proletariat, women*, the colonized, the subaltern) provide unique access to aspects of social reality that remain invisible to dominant groups. Our article examines autotheory not as a tradition with clear genealogical lines but as a constellation of parallel epistemological practices emerging from various margins of dominant knowledge systems. We follow autotheory from Georg Lukács’s analysis of reification to postcolonial and decolonial frameworks, as articulated by Gloria Anzaldúa, arguing that queer-feminist Marxism serves as the crucial bridge between these traditions. Furthermore, we argue that epistemic privilege emerges from con-tradictions between oppressed groups’ normative self-understandings and the practices they are compelled to perform under systems of domination. This framework reveals how dominant epistemologies objectify oppressed groups by treating them instrumentally –as objects of study– while systematically denying their status as autonomous knowledge producers. Autotheory responds by reclaiming epistemic subjectivity without abandoning robust truth claims. This illuminates Anzaldúa’s concept of la facultadas the heightened perceptual capacity developed by those in-habiting borderlands, a survival epistemology born from navigating structural contradictions. Autotheory in Marxist, queer-feminist and decolonial registers contests objectification, theorizing how those positioned at capitalism’s, heteropatriarchy’s and colonialism’s margins might transform themselves and their worlds through practices of epistemic self-liberation.
Ana de Almeida, Mariel Rodríguez· Compendium· 0 citations
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