Unlike other areas of the private law, the law of unjust enrichment stands or falls with the theory upon which it is based.This theory, fashioned primarily by Peter Birks and continued by many other scholars is known as the ‘dominant model’. The model employs a number of crucial concepts such as enrichment, benefit, value, and injustice. Unfortunately, the model has no coherent understanding of these things. Instead, it equivocates over the meanings of these concepts and at times adopts strange and even absurd understandings of them. It has to do this, because the model does not work. The dominant model is a failure. After revealing this, the book goes on to demonstrate how a more constrained and humble law of unjust enrichment might emerge from the wreckage of the dominant model. As scholarly doubts around the dominant model increase, this thought-provoking revision of unjust enrichment is both welcome and needed.
In her article ‘A portrait of understanding as a non-factive state’ Ylwa Sjölin Wirling (2026) argues for the existence of an important but hitherto unnoticed form of understanding that she calls ‘non-factive objectual understanding’ (or NFOU for short). NFOU is the sort of understanding we have when we grasp the range of possible accounts of a phenomena. I agree with Sjölin Wirling that NFOU is real and that it plays an important role in inquiry. However, I have doubts about whether or not it is a form of non-factive understanding, and also about whether it is a form of objectual understanding. Indeed, I suggest that by progressing inquiry and acquiring NFOU we may weaken our objectual understanding of the target phenomenon of inquiry. This is a potentially worrying conclusion for philosophy and related subjects where NFOU is often the best we can hope for.
Andrew Peet· Asian Journal of Philosophy· 0 citations
Following Hanegraaff’s (2020: 73) claim that pioneers in our field considered it “to be no less than essential for any adequate understanding of the history of human culture and society as such,” this text answers Schilbrack’s (2013) question: “After we deconstruct ‘religion’, then what?” The answer is formulated within the debate over the diplomacy of common world face-to-face challenges of the Anthropocene. Within the functionalist tradition, uncertainty and lack of control defined the situation from which religion and magic ought to originate. They constitute the key characteristic of the Anthropocene as a specific historical condition, too. Their practical handling unleashes the full range of world-making activities and processes that shape ways of inhabiting the environment and thus provides an excellent point of analytical focus that can efficiently do without concepts of both religion and belief.
Milan Fujda· Method & Theory in the S...· 0 citations
The recurrent thesis of this book is that on the topic of free will, Descartes is a compatibilist—the will ‘’s freedom is compatible with its choice being determined by perceived evidence for it inone way rather than another. This is to say Descartes does not hold the libertarian view that human freedom requires indifference in the sense that a choice is free when and only when it occurs independently of all else. On this view, the difference that makes the difference in the occurrence or failure to occur of a free choice is nothing more than the unconstrained choice itself. Exploration of these concepts helps to explain how Descartes came to be accused of Pelagianism and Jansenism, both condemned as heresies yet diametrically opposed in these terms. The main focus here, however, is on fundamentally philosophical issues of responsibility, error, certainty, judgment, among others, in their historical context.
This book delivers an in-depth doctrinal analysis of the right to science under Article 15 ICESCR, focusing on the novel concept of its core content, as well as on its rights holders and duty bearers. Monika Plozza challenges the entrenched dichotomy between economic, social and cultural rights on the one hand and civil and political rights on the other, demonstrating that the right to science is fully justiciable. Situating it within the wider framework of international human rights law, she traces its connections with a broad range of related rights. In doing so, this book equips scholars, practitioners and policymakers with the legal tools needed to invoke and implement the right to science in judicial and policy contexts. Timely and rigorous, it establishes the right to science as a vital legal framework for confronting global challenges ranging from climate change and disinformation to artificial intelligence. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.
Fungi offer a striking way to rethink the legal foundations of the Rights of Nature (RoN) movement. While RoN seeks to recognize nature as a rights-bearing subject rather than an object of human use, its legal and philosophical frameworks often remain shaped by human-centered models of subjecthood, embedded in arboreal metaphors of trees and forests. This article argues that these arboreal metaphors reproduce stable identities and hierarchical relations, while fungi foreground interdependence, relationality, and distributed agency that unsettle conventional assumptions about legal subjects. Drawing on key RoN cases and debates in philosophy and legal theory, we show how thinking with fungi helps unbind the subject of law by challenging models of subjectivity that stabilize identities, reinforce hierarchy, and project human exceptionalism onto nature.
Anna-Julia Saiger, Fidel Camilo Cruz Ladino· Public Humanities· 0 citations
Two very general ideas have shaped my thinking about constitutional law. The first is that most of the rights in the Charter protect or advance different aspects of our relationship or connection with others. We are social beings. Who we are – our identity, our agency – is shaped by our interactions with others. Rights such as freedom of expression, religious freedom, and the right to equality, do not simply protect individual autonomy, but instead protect different aspects of human flourishing within community. The second theme is narrower and more legal and has to do with what we can expect from the courts in the protection of rights or the advancement of the public good. Courts are adjudicative bodies. Their role is to interpret and apply the law – existing law - to the cases that come before them. Because courts are insulated from political pressure, they are well suited to the role of adjudicator – to resolving disputes based on the law. At the same time, because they are independent in this way, courts are poorly suited to the task of general policymaking, or the redistribution of resources. In my writing I have explored both these themes, and the tension between them. In this lecture, I will discuss three Charter rights – freedom of expression, the right to equality, and religious freedom – to illustrate what I mean by the social character of rights and the tension between this understanding of rights and the structure of constitutional adjudication.
Richard Moon· Windsor Yearbook of Access t...· 0 citations
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