Using a principled dynamical-systems approach, it is shown that optimal online algorithms arise as solutions of a nonlinear eigenvalue problem: the optimal competitive ratio corresponds to the dominant eigenvalue, and the associated eigenfunction determines the optimal reserve function.
Abstract
We study online allocation with convex costs (\OACC), a generalization of limited-supply models in which additional resources can be produced dynamically at convex cost. Prior work largely focuses on constructing a single algorithm that achieves strong competitive guarantees. In contrast, our main contribution is a structural characterization of the optimal design space of reserve functions (i.e., normalized pricing rules) for \OACC, yielding a family of optimal online algorithms. Using a principled dynamical-systems approach, we show that optimal online algorithms arise as solutions of a nonlinear eigenvalue problem: the optimal competitive ratio corresponds to the dominant eigenvalue, and the associated eigenfunction determines the optimal reserve function. This perspective establishes the existence of infinitely many optimal designs attaining the best possible competitive ratio, thereby unifying and generalizing a broad class of prior algorithms. Beyond unification, our characterization uncovers new structural phenomena, including the ability to flexibly mix dynamic and static pricing without loss of optimality and the construction of universally competitive algorithms under unknown or stochastic costs. We further extend the analysis to more structured settings such as supply-oblivious arrivals and hard supply constraints, obtaining sharper guarantees that improve upon previous bounds.
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