One Model, Many Morals: Uncovering Cross-Linguistic Misalignments in Computational Moral Reasoning

Abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed across multilingual and multicultural settings, yet it remains unclear whether changing language leads models to adopt community-specific moral reasoning or merely changes how shared learned abstractions are expressed. We conduct a controlled multilingual evaluation across six geographically, culturally, and linguistically diverse languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, Hindi, Russian, and Spanish), using parallel moral reasoning benchmarks with English-origin, Chinese-origin, and natively elicited ground-truth judgments. Across 13 open-weight LLMs spanning 2B-70B parameters, we find substantial cross-lingual divergence in moral judgments, with English generally achieving the highest performance even when ground-truth judgments originate in Chinese or are collected natively in each language. Yet the reasoning underlying these divergent judgments is considerably more convergent: Utilitarianism dominates in five of six languages, reasoning follows broadly shared stages, and language-specific moral-value associations correspond only sparsely and inconsistently to values measured in the corresponding human communities. Finally, a large-scale OLMoTrace analysis of pretraining data sources reveals little direct reproduction of training text across languages, while the corpus composition, training stage, and cultural provenance of retrieved training evidence vary substantially by response language. Thus, similar moral reasoning structures emerge even from heterogeneous and often linguistically localized training evidence. Our findings, collectively, reveal a central disconnect in multilingual moral reasoning: language changes models'moral judgments and the training evidence associated with their reasoning, but does not correspondingly localize the moral abstractions they apply.