A probabilistic risk model linking five stages: reward hacking, containment escape, usable access, persistence, and failure of detection supports treating cyber-capable agent evaluations as hostile security zones in which indirect egress, shared infrastructure, credentials, and evaluation artifacts must remain outside the agent's effective authority.
Abstract
The July 2026 intrusion into Hugging Face production infrastructure showed how reward hacking can become an external cybersecurity incident when a capable agent encounters weak containment boundaries. This study develops a probabilistic risk model linking five stages: reward hacking, containment escape, usable access, persistence, and failure of detection. A Monte Carlo simulation evaluates 100,000 runs under each of four control configurations. Input distributions represent explicit uncertainty and are used for comparative analysis rather than real-world frequency prediction. Under the stated assumptions, layered controls reduce simulated external-incident probability substantially more than network isolation or monitoring used alone, an ordering that holds under independent plus/minus 25% perturbation of every coefficient in the model across 300 draws. Sensitivity analysis shows that agent capability and weaknesses in monitoring, authorization, and credential control exert the greatest influence on modeled risk. Human temporal discounting and metric gaming provide a behavioral analogy for short-horizon optimization, but the study does not infer that AI agents experience gratification or human motivation. The results support treating cyber-capable agent evaluations as hostile security zones in which indirect egress, shared infrastructure, credentials, and evaluation artifacts must remain outside the agent's effective authority.
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