Strategic Self-Consistency

Abstract

Self-consistency has become a popular technique for enhancing the reasoning abilities of large language models by generating multiple reasoning paths and selecting the final answer through a majority vote. However, because model providers typically charge users in proportion to the number of reasoning paths generated, they have a financial incentive to artificially increase the path count. In this work, we show that an unfaithful provider can exploit this incentive using a simple, efficient algorithm while avoiding detection by an auditor: by generating and strategically reordering additional reasoning paths, the algorithm makes every path appear necessary to reach the majority. To validate our algorithm, we conduct experiments with multiple instruct models from the Llama and Qwen families, as well as reasoning models distilled from DeepSeek-R1, on benchmark datasets spanning mathematics, science, and question answering. Our results suggest that the distribution of additional reasoning paths generated by our algorithm is heavy-tailed and that substantial capacity to overcharge remains even under the best possible audit designed to keep the false-positive rate below $\alpha = 0.1$.