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How does Adversarial Influence Scale in Multi-Agent Systems?

Sep 2026 · 0 citations · 57 references
Computer Science

TL;DR

It is shown that adding more agents is not a sufficient defense, because the adversary can simply scale with the group, and that allowing deceivers to coordinate privately can make them less effective.

Abstract

Multi-agent deliberation can improve performance, but what happens when some agents do not act in good faith? In practice, an agent may be deceptive and work to subvert the group, whether through its own objectives or external instruction. We study how susceptibility to deception scales as groups increase in size and deceivers become more prevalent. It is not the number of agents in the group that matters, but the proportion of deceivers. We observe that the defection rate, how often initially correct agents switch to an incorrect final answer, rises linearly with this proportion. Whereas humans in comparable conformity studies are reliably swayed only when misleading confederates form a majority, LLM agents defect regularly even when deceivers remain a minority. Susceptibility also depends on which models are interacting, especially on the honest agent side. Unexpectedly, allowing deceivers to coordinate privately can make them less effective. Altogether, our results show that adding more agents is therefore not a sufficient defense, because the adversary can simply scale with the group.

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