The results indicate that evolutionary stability and learning accessibility are distinct properties of a coupled game--learning system in a transparent three-agent governance-motivated game involving a government, a platform firm, and users.
Abstract
Cooperation emergence is a central problem in multi-agent systems because decentralized agents must coordinate while adapting to the changing behavior of others. Evolutionary game theory identifies strategically stable outcomes, but stability under a population adjustment dynamic need not imply that finite-sample learning agents can reach the same outcome through local reward feedback. We study this distinction in a transparent three-agent governance-motivated game involving a government, a platform firm, and users. We derive replicator dynamics for the fixed stage-game incentives, evaluate the cooperative evolutionary basin on a symmetric initial-condition grid, and compare it with learning-basin estimates for three decentralized value-based learners. The learning analysis uses independent Q-learning with $\varepsilon$-greedy action selection, scaled Boltzmann exploration, and SA--EA BQL under the same payoff environment and outcome criterion. The evolutionary basin has volume $V_E=1.00$ on the sampled grid. The empirical learning basin is $0.88$ for $\varepsilon$-IQL and $0.00$ for both scaled Boltzmann and SA--EA BQL. Diagnostic traces show that broader action diversity and nonzero value separation can coexist with failure to sustain the cooperative joint action in this fixed configuration. These results indicate that evolutionary stability and learning accessibility are distinct properties of a coupled game--learning system. The shared-bike setting is a motivating application; the broader contribution is a framework for comparing population-level stability with the finite-sample accessibility of cooperation under specified multi-agent learning dynamics.
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