Sep 2026· Proceedings of the International Conference on Secure Systems Design and Technology Development· Vol 3, pp. 219-222· 0 citations· 13 references
TL;DR
The findings confirm that combined network, log, and protocol-level monitoring provides effective detection across the full range of execution paths, and position DCSync as a technique whose stealth is contingent on tooling selection, authentication protocol, and operational timing rather than on any intrinsic property of the attack itself.
Abstract
This paper examines the DCSync attack from an adversarial perspective, analysing its operational logic, execution variants, and the detection surface each variant presents within monitored Active Directory environments. The study was conducted in a controlled laboratory environment comprising a Windows Server 2019 domain and a monitoring stack including Wireshark, Suricata, and Windows Event Log auditing, enabling systematic comparison of five distinct execution approaches ranging from PowerShell in-memory execution and Mimikatz invocation to Beacon Object File deployment and Impacket-based execution from Linux hosts. Experimental results demonstrate that DCSync's widely assumed low-noise characteristic is method-dependent rather than inherent. Network traffic analysis identifies non-domain-controller source IP addresses, TTL values indicative of Linux origin, and the absence of Kerberos authentication as reliable detection indicators, while Windows Event ID 4662 provides complementary log-based coverage across all tested variants. The findings confirm that combined network, log, and protocol-level monitoring provides effective detection across the full range of execution paths, and position DCSync as a technique whose stealth is contingent on tooling selection, authentication protocol, and operational timing rather than on any intrinsic property of the attack itself.
Modern security monitoring requires laboratory environments that are not only effective for threat observation but also practical to deploy and reproduce. This research presents a Docker-based Wazuh Security Operations Center (SOC) testbed for comparative malware behavior analysis in an isolated Windows 10 environment...
Aurelia Sandra Darmawan, D. Maharani, Alwan Muhammad Fajar et al.· International Conference on...· 0 citations
Security-relevant Agent2Agent (A2A) executions can cross organizational boundaries, leaving investigators without live access to all participating systems. Offline investigation involves checking preserved records and their cross-record relationships for consistency. This paper presents A2A-ForensicTrace, an offline ve...
Adil Alshammari, Sareh Assiri, Hayretdin Bahşi· 0 citations
A2M (Attraction-to-Manipulation), a two-stage black-box framework for hijacking MCP agents, is introduced, a two-stage black-box framework for hijacking MCP agents that motivate stronger tool vetting and runtime isolation in MCP ecosystems.
Lai-Zhen Li, Xuan Wang, Pei-Cheng Zhao et al.· Volume 1· 0 citations
A lightweight host-based ransomware detection and prevention prototype for Windows endpoints that combines three mechanisms: strategically placed deception directories (1000_Trap), localized Shannon-entropy analysis, and automated process termination using psutil is presented.
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Remote Access Trojans (RATs) enable an attacker to establish unauthorized remote control over a compromised host and can maintain command-and-control communication that resembles ordinary network traffic. This study developed and functionally tested a network-monitoring system for observing simulated RAT communication...
N. M. Salleh, Muhammad Amin bin Jamaluddin, S. R. Selamat et al.· International journal of res...· 0 citations
This case study presents a forensically documented analysis of a multi-stage security incident involving CVE-2024-4367, an arbitrary JavaScript execution vulnerability in PDF.js. The incident occurred on one PKP Open Journal Systems (OJS) deployment. The observed chain involved an open redirect in the host platform's s...
Muhammad Hendra Sunarya, M. N. D. Nugroho, Reja Revaldy F et al.· JISKA (Jurnal Informatika Su...· 0 citations
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