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What Memory Composition Does Not Tell Us About Anomaly Detection

Aug 2026 · 0 citations · 30 references
Computer Science

TL;DR

This work uses CLEANCON, an out-of-bag cross-image support gate that changes candidate-image eligibility while fixing the representation, absolute mem- ory size, builder, and inference rule, to probe this coupling with sparse training contamination.

Abstract

Memory-based anomaly detectors store nominal training patches and score test patches against this memory. A patch selected for coverage therefore becomes a nor- mal reference without a separate check that geometric rarity makes it safe to trust. We probe this coupling with sparse training contamination. Under fixed representa- tions and memory budgets, we compare random, medoid, local, and global coverage selectors. We then use CLEANCON, an out-of-bag cross-image support gate that changes candidate-image eligibility while fixing the representation, absolute mem- ory size, builder, and inference rule. Global coverage strongly over-represents sparse contamination. CLEANCON reduces final-memory contamination to approx- imately zero and increases category-macro P-AP in all 12 matched comparisons. Yet along a retention sweep, the lowest-contamination memory does not attain the highest P-AP; performance continues to improve while contamination rises. Mem- ory contamination therefore does not order the resulting memories by P-AP

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