It is shown that logical incoherencies follow from an LLM’s computation of its internal representations, in particular from an LLM’s failure to take account of the different roles that different expressions may play in determining content.
Abstract
Despite great performance on many tasks, language models (LMs) still struggle with reasoning, sometimes providing responses that cannot possibly be true because they stem from logical incoherence. Extending on the arguments of Asher and Bhar (2024), we show that logical incoherencies follow from an LLM’s computation of its internal representations, in particular from an LLM’s failure to take account of the different roles that different expressions may play in determining content. Linguistics and logicians have shown the importance of the fact that logical operators provide a structure on which to compute content recursively. We extend this view of logical tokens to structure at the discursive level with an eye to improving pragmatic reasoning as well as deductive reasoning. The key in reasoning is that these structures introduce
operations over an LM’s latent representations that constrain how they may evolve
. We show how LLMs can leverage those structures.
It is found that while all models show sensitivity to existential presupposition across syntactic embeddings, determiner types and contextual cues, their behaviour differs markedly in strength and systematicity, with NLI-fine-tuned autoregressive models exhibiting the most coherent and stable projection patterns.
Marie-Léontine Wörgötter, Shiyang Lai, Sebastian Schuster· International Conference on...· 0 citations
Logical reasoning with large language models (LLMs) is a critical capability, as it reflects a system's ability to correctly deduce hypotheses from a given context using faithful deductive processes. However, LLM reasoning has often been shown to be sensitive to small surface-level variations in problem formulation, raising questions about whether models truly follow the underlying logical structure. Studying this behavior is challenging because the symbolic components of logical problems, such as operators and predicates, are difficult to systematically manipulate in natural language. We introduce a tool-driven framework for generating controlled, label-preserving edits to logical reasoning problems. Our method operates on symbolic representations of first-order logic and constraint satisfaction problem tasks, enabling targeted modifications to logical operators and other structural components before translating them back into natural language. Using this framework, we evaluate various LLMs under cumulative and individual operator edits and analyze their behavior in response to these changes. Our quantitative and qualitative analyses show that LLM reasoning behavior under controlled operator edits is inconsistent, regardless of model size or family: models sometimes adapt correctly to structural changes but often fail to track their logical consequences. The results from this automated stress test enable an evaluation of language models across different dimensions and help measure the reliability of their reasoning.
Ramya Keerthy Thatikonda, W. Buntine, Ehsan Shareghi· 0 citations
This work investigates how instruction-tuned Transformer models (LLaMA and Mistral) encode discourse relations in English, with a particular focus on the contrasting relations of causation and antithesis, suggesting asymmetric representation of discourse-based reasoning.
A. Bhattacharyya, Shira Wein· SIGDIAL Conferences· 0 citations
Humans naturally form and express beliefs in daily communication, e.g.,"I think the answer is 3"or"I suppose that's right."Such beliefs inevitably intertwine with fact and knowledge, making the ability to handle them in tandem desirable for large language models (LLMs), as they are increasingly deployed in user-facing settings. Prior work showed that even capable LLMs exhibit a systemic weakness in acknowledging user beliefs grounded in incorrect information. We extend this evaluation to 10 LLMs across 18 epistemic expressions and find that the size and direction of this weakness depend on the verb used to express the belief, with the accuracy gap between factual and false information ranging from +50% on"I vaguely remember"to -14% on"I seriously doubt". We further show that the phenomenon stems from what we call task confusion: models default to fact-checking the underlying claim, overriding the user's stated belief. We provide evidence where chains of thought that explicitly fact-check show lower accuracy on false information than those that do not, and a single instruction can reverse the failure across verb families. Mechanistically, models attend more to false beliefs they fail to confirm, but suppressing this attention at decoding time recovers accuracy only partially and only in some models, calling for future work on intervention methods. Our findings clarify prior results and show how fact-checking, a generally desirable behavior, can interfere with belief tracking in LLMs.
Quang Minh Nguyen, Luis Frentzen Salim· 0 citations
This work presents the first systematic study of inverse relation directionality in LLMs, using a benchmark consisting of 5,457 instances spanning 27 distinct inverse relation labels and reveals systematic asymmetries in inverse relation classification across LLMs.
Sefika Efeoglu, A. Paschke· 0 citations
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