H–trace: a fine–grained access control and traceability framework for medical data sharing based on administrative hierarchies

Abstract

The rapid digitalization of healthcare is driving medical data sharing across hospitals, departments, regional centers, and health authorities. In such cross-domain settings, secure sharing requires fine-grained authorization, chain-confirmed revocation, auditable access, and accountability for content leakage after legitimate use. Existing access-control schemes often fail to capture real healthcare administrative hierarchies, impose heavy computation on lightweight clinical terminals, or stop at key-level accountability. To address these challenges, we propose H-Trace, a hierarchical access-control and traceability framework for medical data sharing. H-Trace aligns cryptographic delegation with healthcare administrative structures through Hierarchical Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (H-CP-ABE), and decouples policy enforcement from bulk data encryption using a Key Encapsulation Mechanism–Data Encapsulation Mechanism hybrid architecture. Gateway-assisted transformation shifts pairing-intensive computation away from resource-constrained terminals, while a permissioned consortium blockchain maintains revocation states, audit records, session metadata, and watermark anchors. For ex-post leakage investigation, H-Trace embeds session-bound invisible watermarks into released medical images, binding the released content to user identity, access session, and on-chain evidence. Security analysis shows that H-Trace achieves selective IND-CPA security and resists collusion attacks and out-of-scope delegation. Prototype evaluations demonstrate sub-millisecond post-transformation secret-recovery overhead in the tested setting, efficient protection of large medical files, and recoverable watermark tracing under typical distortions while maintaining diagnostic readability.