We study normal-form noncooperative games corresponding to Common-Pool Resource (CPR) situations. A social planner aims to regulate the use of the resource and acts as a leader in a two-stage game. The followers are non-cooperative players who choose a Nash equilibrium representing optimal extraction levels. Due to unc...
L. Greco, L. Mallozzi· Decision Making and Analysis· 0 citations
In this paper, we consider generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) seeking in non-cooperative games with coupled constraint sets. Specifically, we aim to enforce safety for distributed GNE seeking, whereby the safety specifications are encoded in the coupled constraint set. To achieve this, we introduce the control barrier...
We introduce a novel mean‐field game model for multi‐sector economic growth in which a dynamically evolving externality, influenced by the collective action of countries, plays a central role. By integrating environmental considerations in classical growth models, the framework incorporates “common noise” to capture sh...
Pierre Lavigne, Q. Petit, Xavier Warin· Mathematical Finance· 0 citations
This paper is concerned with distributed generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) seeking problem for noncooperative monotone games with coupled constraints. Each individual player aims to minimize its local cost function, which depends not only on its own decision, but also on other players’ decisions. By exploiting variati...
Numerical results show that these inner approximations are much more scalable than the stochastic programming formulation, while reaping most of the benefits of cross-zonal exchanges, and can also accommodate co-optimization of energy and balancing capacity products.
M. Madani, Zejun Ruan, Anthony Papavasiliou· 0 citations
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