SoK: Reconstruction Attacks on Synthetic Tabular Data (Insights from Winning the NIST CRC)

Abstract

Synthetic data is increasingly promoted as a privacy-preserving substitute for releasing sensitive tabular records, yet its central adversarial threat (reconstruction, the recovery of an individual's hidden attribute values from a synthetic release and a handful of known quasi-identifiers) has been studied only in scattered, hard-to-compare settings. We systematize reconstruction (equivalently, attribute inference) attacks on de-identified and synthetic tabular data. We contribute a taxonomy that organizes attacks by the structure they exploit; a broad, controlled empirical evaluation, pitting fourteen attacks against thirteen synthetic data generation (SDG) methods across five benchmark datasets; and a set of new attacks that fill gaps in the taxonomy, one of which (CoBP-RA) is the strongest attack we measure. We also introduce a methodology for interpreting what attack success means: a memorization test that distinguishes reconstruction of the population distribution from memorization of training records, and a reduction that places reconstruction and membership inference on a single comparable scale. Our findings: the choice of SDG method governs risk far more than the choice of attack; differential privacy reduces reconstruction steadily up to epsilon approximately 10, above which reconstruction risk levels off for all six DP mechanisms we sweep, bounded by what each synthesizer can represent rather than by its noise; de-identification methods are the most exposed, with diffusion the only synthesizer close behind; and most reconstruction reflects distributional structure rather than memorization, concentrating individual risk on atypical records. Our attacks and infrastructure are externally validated by our first-place finish in the 2025 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Collaborative Research Cycle.