Optimization of Electricity Market Trading Mechanism under High Penetration of New Energy Research on Cross Provincial and Cross Regional Electricity Resource Allocation and Pricing Strategies Based on Game Theory

Abstract

Against the background of the dual-carbon strategy and accelerated construction of a new power system, new energy has entered a high-penetration stage characterized by volatility, intermittency, and spatial mismatch between resource supply and load demand. Traditional inter-provincial and inter-regional electricity trading mechanisms can no longer fully adapt to the random output and anti-peak-shaving characteristics of new energy. This study focuses on cross-provincial and cross-regional electricity resource allocation and pricing strategies under high penetration of new energy. Based on game theory, a multi-agent analytical framework is constructed, integrating Cournot competition among power generation entities, Stackelberg pricing between grid enterprises and market participants, and Shapley value-based cooperative benefit allocation among provinces. The study analyzes contradictions in resource-load spatial mismatch, trading-mode rigidity, price-signal distortion, transmission congestion, and regional benefit distribution. It further proposes an integrated mechanism combining priority trading for new energy, time-sharing and zonal nodal pricing, endogenous congestion sharing, revenue sharing, and full-time-sequence coordination from medium- and long-term trading to real-time dispatch.