Aug 2026· Annals of Operations Research· 0 citations· 26 references
Abstract
Practical decision-making in business and government regularly involves interaction with competitors (and other agents such as suppliers and customers). These interactions can have a significant effect on optimal decision making. To determine optimal prices, for example, a monopoly firm may need to vary prices to learn consumer demand, but, with competition, varying prices may provide information to competitors that is counterproductive. This paper shows that, while firms in competition may be able to learn optimal best-response strategies over time, in some settings, this result is not an ex ante optimal strategy for the competitors when actions reveal information to others. In this situation, the firms can achieve a collaborative outcome in equilibrium by not fully exploring and learning the environment with both firms earning more than they would in a competitive equilibrium with full information. The result has implications for policies (such as price or production controls) that restrict firm actions or that require disclosures.
Problem definition: Startup firms, often small in size, face the challenge of making cross-functional decisions due to the absence of distinct departments like marketing and operations. These interdependent decisions are further complicated by the lack of historical customer data. As a result, these firms must learn ab...
Huseyin Gurkan, N. Keskin, R. Parker· Manufacturing & Service...· 0 citations
This paper investigates multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) in settings where firms compete for customers using congestible resources. We consider Bertrand competition in which firms compete by announcing prices and customers choose among firms based on both price and congestion. The relationship between price, c...
In this paper we construct a dynamic entry deterrence game in which market demand follows the Chan-Karolyi-Longstaff-Sanders (CKLS) stochastic differential equation (SDE). The incumbent firm, whose true strength is privately known, uses advertising and promotional expenditures strategically to shape the entrant’s belie...
M. Issah, Paramahansa Pramanik· SN Business & Economics· 0 citations
This paper examines the application of basic game theory in financial decision-making, with a focus on strategic interaction, information asymmetry, and equilibrium outcomes in financial markets. Traditional financial decision-making models often assume that market participants act independently and have access to simi...
Jun-Hao Wang· Advances in Economics, Manag...· 0 citations
Long-horizon competition tests agents'ability to coordinate business decisions under uncertainty and adapt to changing rival strategies. We introduce CEO Arena, a benchmark that uses matched replacement evaluation to assess operating returns alongside an agent's effects on rivals and the market. Each CEO agent is compa...
An Yan, Yu-Jia Huo, Zhi-Wei Shang et al.· 0 citations
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