Computer-use agents (CUA) are being deployed to browse the web and operate desktop software, yet their benchmark scores are still commonly produced by brittle scripted oracles. A score is the output of a pipeline in which tasks can be stale, trajectories can omit decisive visual evidence, evaluators can reject valid alternatives, and aggregate reports can hide the cause of failure. We organize these problems into a reliability framework spanning task construction, trajectory observation, scoring, and reporting. We then audit 150 public failure-scored trajectories from five web, enterprise-workflow, and desktop-control benchmarks, find that 15.3\% of FAIL verdicts are wrong: 10.7\% are evaluator false negatives and 4.7\% are broken tasks. For genuine failures, a three-tier diagnostic taxonomy shows that verification/feedback and planning failures dominate execution/grounding errors, while a single scalar success rate can not explain. We connect these findings to newer long-horizon CUA benchmarks and derive stage-specific design rules for CUA evaluation.
Zi-Han Dong, Zhiyuan Ma, Zekun Wang et al.· arXiv.org· 2 citations
A benchmark score is a measurement instrument, yet most benchmarks read each item at a single canonical surface form. We ask whether that reading is faithful: when an item's intent is held fixed and only its meaning-preserving surface form varies, does the canonical-form score estimate model behavior well, and how much of any variation is decoding/judge noise rather than signal? We instantiate this in safety, a high-stakes setting with no gold label to average toward. To avoid prior confounds, we pre-author the reformulations (refusal-free, mostly non-LLM: machine back-translation and a Matrix-Language-Frame code-switch generator) so an identical surface form reaches every model, score all responses with one human-anchored, vendor-neutral judge (Claude, kappa = 0.86 vs. human on unsafe compliance, stable across languages, cross-checked by GPT-4o), and verify intent preservation. On 370 seeds x 5 surface forms x 5 models, no single transformation is uniformly most dangerous (6 of 20 per-transformation McNemar tests survive correction, most protective). Yet evaluating only the canonical prompt underestimates unsafe compliance: the union of unsafe outcomes across forms exceeds even the worst single form by 3.3-12.9 pp, with bootstrap 95% CIs excluding zero for all five models, and 5-13% of seeds safe on canonical are unsafe under some reformulation -- above a zero stochasticity floor (canonical resampled five times at temperature 0 gives 0/370 new exposures). The size of this gap is model-dependent (largest on Gemini 2.5 Pro). One form recovers only ~53% of a model's observed unsafe surface and about three reach 85% -- a redundancy characterization of this form set, not of a defined population. A benign control (XSTest) suggests the instability is bidirectional, though the benign and harmful pools are not item-matched. We release the dataset, code, and per-response labels.
Yongxin Zhou, Jun-Wei Yao, Yuanzhe Liu et al.· 1 citation
HPSE is proposed, which builds a hybrid rollout that steps in to place missing facts onto the student's own trajectory precisely where its coverage fails, while staying on-policy elsewhere.
Tianci Liu, Zi-Han Dong, Tian-Chun Li et al.· 0 citations
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