Reverse engineering is essential for software security analysis and vulnerability detection. Decompilation, the process of lifting binaries to high-level pseudocode, is central to this task. However, production binaries are hostile environments: aggressive compiler optimizations and adversarial obfuscation jointly mangle control structures, obscure variable intents, and disguise high-level program logic. Consequently, existing LLM-based decompilation tools frequently suffer from structural collapse and semantic hallucinations. We present ReSource, the first multi-phase LLM framework designed for transformation-agnostic source recovery. To tackle these intertwined distortions, ReSource conceptualizes the binary-to-source discrepancies into three orthogonal tiers, namely lexical, syntactic, and semantic, and decouples the recovery process accordingly. First, to ground the LLM and prevent logic drift, it retrieves empirical priors from a curated Semantic Distortion Database. Second, to resolve control-flow flattening, it integrates a lightweight predictor to reconstruct the source-level structural skeleton. Finally, a contextual lexical deduction stage refines identifiers to restore human readability. Evaluated on a massive benchmark of over 80,000 decompiled-source function pairs across three optimization levels and four obfuscation techniques, ReSource achieves an 83% Top-5 source retrieval accuracy and an average similarity score of 0.66. By maintaining robust semantic identifiability where state-of-the-art baselines (DeGPT, LLM4Decompile, and FidelityGPT) severely overfit or degrade, ReSource provides a scalable and reliable foundation for downstream security analysis.
Zhiping Zhou, Xiaohong Li, Ruitao Feng et al.· 0 citations
Agent Skills extend LLM agents with reusable instruction packages that may also include scripts, resources, and service configuration. This creates a direct distribution channel for malicious behavior, yet existing malicious-Skill datasets are fragmented across sources, artifact formats, evidence regimes, and benign coverage; duplicated and structurally related content further complicates direct aggregation and evaluation. We present MaliciousSkillBench, a comprehensive benchmark for malicious Agent Skill detection. We consolidate 13 public sources, 11 of which contribute Core malicious artifacts, and reduce 8,414 raw malicious records to 7,539 normalized-unique identities in 4,588 operational structural families. After conservative cross-label conflict exclusion, the primary benchmark contains 9,740 Skills: 7,505 malicious and 2,235 benign. To characterize its coverage, we harmonize 11 attack categories for 4,983 malicious identities with supported source-native mappings and find substantial differences in threat composition across sources. We then evaluate three learned text detectors and three off-the-shelf Skill scanners. Learned detectors achieve 0.882-0.932 Random Macro-F1 but only 0.653-0.665 under Source-Disjoint evaluation; the strongest word TF-IDF SVM scores 0.932/0.916/0.665 on Random/structural-disjoint/Source-Disjoint while retaining 95.6% malicious recall but producing 62.4% benign FPR on held-out sources. Off-the-shelf scanners occupy different but also unsatisfactory operating regimes, reducing false positives only at the cost of sharply lower malicious recall. Together, these results show that reliable malicious-Skill detection requires both broader cross-source benchmark coverage and evaluation that jointly measures attack detection and benign over-flagging.
Yue Wang, Yi Liu, Gelei Deng et al.· 0 citations
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