Multi-turn attacks on agentic systems can compose individually permissible actions into harmful outcomes, challenging defenses that assess actions or states in isolation. We show that such attacks leave a detectable signature in the agent's internal representations: harmful behavior emerges as an accumulated representa...
Hao-Yu Wang, Wei Zhao, Ye-Di Zhang et al.· 0 citations
Neuron- and path-level interventions offer the finest-grained route to defending large language models (LLMs) against jailbreak attacks, yet existing methods fall short of this promise, i.e., they often compromise model utility significantly. Specifically, one line of work suppresses toxic neurons to erase harmful sema...
Wei Zhao, Zhe Li, Pei-Xin Zhang et al.· 0 citations
As large language models are increasingly deployed in real-world systems, safety failures can still lead to harmful outputs and dangerous misuse. We argue that the essence of safety is adversarial: many failures arise not from natural inputs alone, but from strategic attempts to evade model policies and safeguards. How...
Ting Ma, Xiufeng Huang, Benlei Cui et al.· 0 citations
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