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Tianyu Du

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Jul 2026

Decision-Level Hijacking: Injecting Cognitive Bias into Large Language Models via Bit-Flip Attacks

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been widely applied in high-stakes decision-making scenarios such as corporate strategy, and users are increasingly relying on their outputs. However, the deep integration of open-source model sharing ecosystems with LLM-powered critical decision-making applications also introduces critical risks: if an attacker can manipulate the model's cognitive stance, they can indirectly influence the judgments and actions of downstream decision-makers. This paper defines such threats as decision-level hijacking. Existing attacks fail to achieve targeted cognitive manipulation without triggering prohibited content or degrading model functionality. To fill this gap, this paper reveals that Bit-Flip Attacks (BFAs) can serve as an attack vector for inducing decision-level hijacking, requiring no real-time interaction or control over the training process, and only a minimal number of weight bits need to be flipped after deployment to achieve stealthy, low-cost, and persistent cognitive manipulation. Therefore, we propose CogBias, a cognitive bias injection framework for LLMs. CogBias converts subjective preferences into optimization signals via a differentiable sentiment evaluator, uses a multi-objective loss to jointly constrain multiple dimensions, and constructs BitScout to locate critical bits, achieving targeted cognitive intervention under an ultra-sparse flip budget. Experiments on Llama-3.2-3B, Mistral-7B, and Qwen2.5-14B, as well as on the commercial recommendation and controversial factual topic scenarios, demonstrate that flipping only a small number of bits stably induces significant stance shifts on target topics, while the impact on non-target tasks and overall output distribution is limited. This work demonstrates that minute perturbations to low-level weight data suffice to undermine the high-level value alignment of LLMs.

Yu Yan, Jia-Hao Chen, Siqi Lu et al. · 0 citations
#natural language process... Preprint Aug 2026

Beyond the Payload: How User Invocation Shapes Coding Agent Vulnerability to Repository Poisoning

CIPR (Coding In Poisoned Repos), the first benchmark that systematically varies PLCs in poisoned real-world repositories, is introduced and highlights that coding agent vulnerability is not a static property, but a dynamic outcome shaped by everyday user configurations.

Fu-Kang Zhu, Binbin Zhao, Ruixiao Lin et al. · 0 citations
Preprint Aug 2026

Beyond Over-Refusal: Defending Indirect Prompt Injection via Latent Instruction Manifolds

AEGIS (Adaptive Ensemble Guard for Injection Shielding) extracts instruction-sensitive projectors to identify malicious instructions and leverages a Unified Multi-Layer Consensus mechanism that aggregates topologically distinct signals across the network depth.

Jia-Hao Chen, Ruiping Yin, Xinfeng Li et al. · 0 citations
Book Open access Aug 2026

The Boy Who Cried Wolf: Adversarial Misclassification of Safe Inputs as Unsafe in Multimodal Guardrails

Unsafe Semantic Distillation is proposed, which aligns adversarial perturbations with distributional representations of unsafe content rather than prompt-specific instances, and achieves 84% attack success rates, outperforming existing methods and exposing fundamental vulnerabilities in current multimodal safety architectures.

Shuo Shi, Ruiping Yin, Naen Xu et al. · 1 citation

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