Competitive analysis is central to the study of online algorithms, but upper bounds are often highly problem-specific. We develop a more unifying methodology via the minimax viewpoint. Guided by Yao's principle, we reduce worst-case competitive analysis to Bayesian online design under an arbitrary correlated prior over arrival sequences. For such a prior, let $X^*$ be the hindsight-optimal fractional solution for the realized instance, and let $X^{(t)}=\mathbb E[X^*\mid \mathcal F_t]$ be its posterior process. Our guiding rule is posterior matching: at each time $t$, choose the feasible online action that tracks the current posterior $X^{(t)}$ as closely as the online constraints permit. We show that this single principle yields optimal or near-optimal guarantees for several classical online fractional problems, including set cover, load balancing, matching and more general resource-allocation problems, recovering or improving state-of-the-art bounds in these settings with norm/concave objectives. Via known rounding reductions, it also yields randomized integral guarantees for weighted paging, MTS on star metrics, and ski-rental. At a technical level, our analysis reduces competitive guarantees to key probabilistic inequalities for the vector martingales generated by the posterior of the offline optimum. The resulting framework gives a reusable route from Bayesian online design under arbitrary correlated priors to information-theoretic worst-case competitive guarantees.
Thomas Kesselheim, Marco Molinaro, Kalen Patton et al.· 0 citations
We introduce and study an online variant of the multi-agent contract model. In our model, agents arrive one-by-one and are active with a certain probability. Upon arrival of agent $i$, the principal offers a linear contract $\alpha_i$, specifying the fraction of the principal's reward transferred to agent $i$. Agents can either exert effort or not, incurring a cost if they do. The set of agents that exert effort determines the principal's expected reward through a reward function $f$. After all agents have arrived, the agents form a (pure) Nash equilibrium. As our main result we design an $O(1)$-competitive policy for submodular rewards, compared to the offline optimum. We also show that this result is tight in two ways. First, if we require that agents make decisions on the spot, then for submodular rewards any policy is $\Omega((\log n)/(\log \log n)^2)$-competitive. Second, for the broader class of XOS (a.k.a., fractionally subadditive) rewards, any online policy is $\Omega((\log \log n)/(\log \log \log n))$-competitive. The latter result reveals a surprising separation between submodular and XOS rewards: unlike related settings such as offline contract design and prophet inequalities, where constant-factor guarantees for submodular rewards extend to XOS rewards, the online contract setting separates the two classes.
Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur et al.· 0 citations
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