This letter investigates a task-unified multi-level radio-frequency (RF) sensing framework driven by vision-language models (VLMs). Existing RF sensing methods rely on task-specific designs and provide only partial environmental information, limiting their ability to handle emerging 6G applications. To address this, we propose a generative formulation for RF sensing, where millimeter-wave (mmWave)/terahertz (THz) channel gains are mapped to captions describing multi-level environmental semantics. The framework solves this problem through a complementary design for RF-environment semantic bridging, where a VLM is fine-tuned to leverage its multimodal representations and prompt-conditioned semantic generation capabilities. Hence, different sensing tasks are specified through textual prompts, enabling the framework to handle diverse tasks in a unified manner. For fine-tuning, we introduce prompt-routed low-rank adaptation (LoRA) experts to achieve level-aware adaptation. Simulation results show that, compared with baselines, our framework achieves superior performance with a broader semantic scope, and enables task-unified sensing beyond predefined tasks. Under an unseen sensing requirement, it achieves an average F1-score improvement of 0.17 over the most competitive variant.
Tianyu Hu, Zhi-Ren Gong, Hao-Wei Cui et al.· 0 citations
Classical opinion dynamics typically assume a fixed mapping from private opinions to public signals, such as linear exchange, saturated signaling, or discrete public actions. In this paper, we show that these communication mappings can be derived from a strategic communication game played on a weighted influence network. Each agent acts as a receiver estimating its neighbors'states and as a sender broadcasting a public signal to influence its audience. We prove that the network's effect on a sender is summarized by a scalar, network-induced exaggeration factor, and the network game decouples into independent scalar cheap talk problems. The communication rules then emerge as behavioral regimes of one model: aligned incentives recover linear averaging; persuasive senders facing naive receivers produce saturated signaling; and persuasive senders facing Bayesian receivers cannot credibly reveal their opinions, so equilibrium communication becomes an interval quantizer, providing a game-theoretic foundation for continuous-opinion discrete-action (CODA) dynamics. Embedded in repeated opinion updates, the resulting strategic-CODA dynamics preserve opinion clustering and exclude extremism. The model predicts that a speaker exaggerates more when their audience is less influenced by them, and that under strong exaggeration, credible public expression collapses to a binary stance even while private opinions remain continuous.
Hassan Munif, Anthony Couthures, V. Varma et al.· arXiv.org· 0 citations
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