We introduce a verification framework to numerically analyze inexact model predictive controllers (MPCs) in the constrained non-linear discrete-time setting. Rather than modifying the controller so that guarantees hold by construction, we treat the controller as given. In particular, we focus on two types of inexact controllers: (a) one whose input is extracted from a primal-dual point satisfying the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of the non-convex MPC problem, and (b) one whose input is obtained by linearizing the dynamics and solving a convex quadratic program. The main idea of our verification framework is to formulate an optimization problem that searches over the worst-case initial state within a given set and control inputs consistent with the inexact controller to maximize a carefully-chosen performance metric. Using this framework, we show how to certify (i) the worst-case suboptimality gap of a single MPC problem, (ii) the worst-case closed-loop suboptimality gap over a given number of dynamical system iterations, (iii) closed-loop stability, and (iv) feasibility of the closed-loop system. Through numerical examples, we showcase the ability of our framework to precisely quantify both types of suboptimality, and to test the stability and feasibility of the inexact controllers.
Rajiv Sambharya, S. C. Anand, George J. Pappas· 0 citations
This paper deals with security allocation challenges for networked control systems represented by positive-weighted digraphs under stealthy false data injection attacks. These systems consist of interconnected subsystems, referred to as nodes in the underlying digraph, where an adversary aims to maximize network performance loss by stealthily attacking specific nodes. Meanwhile, a defender monitors several nodes to impose stealthiness constraints on the adversary's actions, thereby minimizing the network performance loss. We analyze the worst-case network performance loss of these stealthy attacks and make the following contributions: we (i) show that the worst-case network performance loss is upper-bounded by a tractable semi-definite programming (SDP) problem; (ii) establish the relationship between the SDP problem and the Katz centrality measure of the underlying digraph under a sufficient condition, resulting in a network-size-independent optimization problem; and (iii) provide a heuristic search based on the Katz centrality measure of the underlying digraph for selecting sub-optimal monitor nodes against all admissible attack scenarios without solving optimization problems. These results offer practical insights for safeguarding large-scale networked control systems against stealthy false data injection attacks. The obtained results are validated via extensive simulations on Erdos-Renyi random graphs with different network sizes.
A. Nguyen, S. C. Anand, André M. H. Teixeira· 0 citations
We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads.
See our Cookie Policy.
