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Nicholas J. Teh

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#artificial intelligence Preprint Oct 2026

Learning Lotteries with Minimal Stakeholder Violations from Membership Queries

An AI developer often has several candidate versions of a system and can deploy a mixture of them, sending each request to a randomly chosen version, sending each request to a randomly chosen version, as in A/B testing, so the number of rejecting agents is minimized.

Nicholas J. Teh, Paul W. Goldberg · 0 citations
Preprint Sep 2026

Online Fair Division under an Oblivious Adversary

We study online fair division, where indivisible goods arrive one at a time and must be allocated immediately and irrevocably among $n\ge2$ agents. Against an oblivious adversary that fixes the input in advance, we ask what fairness guarantees randomized online algorithms can achieve. We present the Deficit Allocation...

Saar Cohen, Nicholas J. Teh, Michael Wooldridge · 3 citations
Preprint Oct 2026

Online Fair Division with Upgrade Recourse

We study the online fair division of indivisible goods. In the standard model, where assignments are irrevocable, no algorithm can guarantee any positive fraction of the maximin share (MMS). Reassigning earlier goods can restore fairness, but it may take value away from agents who already hold them. We ask how much fai...

Yi-Chen Huang, Nicholas J. Teh · 1 citation
Preprint Sep 2026

Strengthening Proportionality in Participatory Budgeting with Additive Utilities

Proportional representation is a central goal in participatory budgeting, where voters select public projects subject to a shared budget. Full justified representation (FJR) accounts for groups whose members may value different projects, but computing an FJR outcome is strongly NP-hard for additive utilities. We show t...

Tzeh Yuan Neoh, Nicholas J. Teh · 2 citations
Preprint Sep 2026

Weighted Fair Division of Indivisible Mixed Manna

We study weighted fair division of indivisible mixed manna under additive valuations. First, we resolve the general existence open question for weighted envy-freeness up to one item (WEF1), and show that every instance with arbitrary positive entitlements admits a complete WEF1 allocation computable in polynomial time....

Nicholas J. Teh · 1 citation
Preprint Oct 2026

Minimizing Cumulative Envy in Allocating a Sequence of Items

We study temporal fair division with indivisible goods that arrive sequentially and must be allocated irrevocably. In contrast to the usual online model, we assume that valuations and future arrivals are known in advance, and ask how unfairness evolves during the process. We introduce \emph{cumulative maximum envy}: th...

Paul W. Goldberg, Isaac Robinson, Nicholas J. Teh · 7 citations
Preprint Sep 2026

Full Justified Representation in Temporal Voting: Efficient Computation and Verification

In temporal voting, a fixed set of voters makes a collective decision in each of several rounds, and proportionality requires that groups with shared interests be represented across these decisions. Full justified representation (FJR) is among the strongest proportionality axioms known to be satisfiable in this setting...

Nicholas J. Teh · 4 citations
Preprint Aug 2026

Temporal Fair Division of Indivisible Mixed Manna: Tractable Settings

Although deciding whether a TEF1 allocation exists is NP-hard even for goods, this work identifies several tractable settings and gives an exact pseudo-polynomial algorithm for deciding TEF1 existence.

Kui-Wang Choi, Min-Ming Li, Nicholas J. Teh · 10 citations
Preprint Sep 2026

Closing Gaps in Online Fair Division

This work determines the tight high-probability PROP1 guarantee of the classical Like rule, which assigns each good uniformly among the agents who value it positively, and improves when fewer agents value the same good, unlike uniform random allocation.

Tzeh Yuan Neoh, Nicholas J. Teh · 9 citations · ⚡2
Preprint Sep 2026

Online Fair Division Against an Oblivious Adversary

This work studies the online allocation of indivisible goods among $n agents, where each good must be allocated immediately and irrevocably upon arrival, and shows that allocating each good to a uniformly random agent among those with positive values achieves an approximation factor arbitrarily close to one for envy-fr...

Saar Cohen, Nicholas J. Teh, Michael Wooldridge · 3 citations
#artificial intelligence Preprint Sep 2026

Proportional Representation in Temporal Voting with Ranked Preferences

We study proportional representation in temporal voting, where one candidate is selected in each round. While prior work has focused on approval ballots, we consider ranked preferences, which may change over time. A natural approach treats each voter's top candidates as approved, but the right cutoff may differ across...

Noam Hazon, Leora Schmerler, Nicholas J. Teh · 3 citations

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