Large language models (LLMs) perform remarkably well on complex tasks, yet remain highly vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious instructions embedded in external data can override user intent. Existing defenses remain limited by model fine-tuning requirements, vulnerability to adaptive attacks, or reli...
Lu-Man Zhao, Ming-Hui Xu, Yue Zhang et al.· 0 citations
Results show that proxy-based empirical gain achieves strong ranking agreement with proxy-defined realized utility and substantially outperforms row-count and token-count baselines in the tested setting, while the prototype provides a controlled sanity check of the valuation pipeline and its sensitivity to duplication-...
Ming-Hui Xu, Qi-Meng Luo, Kun Li et al.· arXiv.org· 1 citation
Multilingual and related-code evaluations further show effective forgetting with limited impact on useful programming capabilities, supporting UNBIND as a practical approach to selective code unlearning.
Zhengyang Shan, Jia-Yu Xin, Yan-Jun Lin et al.· 0 citations
OBLIVION, a controlled benchmark and defense harness for revoked-skill resurrection, and results support workflow-level evaluation beyond checking explicit skill entries support workflow-level evaluation beyond checking explicit skill entries.
Zhengyang Shan, Xuancheng Qian, Jiayu Xin et al.· 0 citations
Mask2Shield (M2S), a masked-forward alignment method that trains a model under this functional pruning procedure, reduces successful recomputed pruning attacks from 80--279 to 1--44 out of 313 prompts while generally preserving four capability benchmarks.