We investigate the problem of allocating indivisible chores among agents with arbitrary positive weights and additive nonnegative cost functions. An allocation is said to be $\alpha$-weighted-maximin-share (WMMS) fair if the cost incurred by each agent is at most $\alpha$ times her weighted maximin share. We establish...
Trung Thanh Nguyen, Khaled Elbassioni, Jörg Rothe· 0 citations
We study the problem of computing an allocation of indivisible items that maximizes egalitarian welfare, i.e., the utility of the worst-off agent, when agents'item values or marginal values belong to a small set. For additive valuations with values in $\{p,q\}$, where $q>p>0$ and $\gcd(p,q)=1$, we give a polynomial-tim...
T. Vu, Trung Thanh Nguyen, Khaled Elbassioni et al.· 0 citations
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