Prompt injection poses significant security risks to LLM agents. Efficient and effective red-teaming is therefore critical, both for evaluating these risks and for collecting training data to improve defenses. Existing state-of-the-art prompt injection red-teaming methods primarily rely on reinforcement learning (RL), producing attacker models that often generalize poorly to new target LLMs. In this work, we develop PIMiner, an agentic system for prompt injection red-teaming. During training, PIMiner is trained on a sequence of (dataset, target model) pairs and builds a strategy library from scratch. At test time, the learned strategy library can be directly transferred to a previously unseen target LLM without additional training. PIMiner requires only a small number of queries to a target agent (e.g., 10) per test sample. Experimental results demonstrate that PIMiner achieves strong performance. On IPIArena, it attains a 76.2% ASR against Gemini-2.5-Pro, 61.9% ASR against GPT-5.1, and 42.9% ASR against Claude-Sonnet-4.5. On AgentDojo, it achieves an 86.7% ASR against Gemini-2.5-Pro, 53.3% ASR against GPT-5.1, and 40.0% ASR against Claude-Sonnet-4.5.
Yanting Wang, Chenlong Yin, Runpeng Geng et al.· 0 citations
LongPIBench is introduced, a long-context benchmark for prompt injection covering 4 realistic application scenarios: paper peer review, resume screening, code review, and email summary, and the evaluation results reveal significant vulnerabilities of prompt injection defenses under long-context settings.
Yupei Liu, Yuqi Jia, N. Gong et al.· 0 citations
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