Machine unlearning for vision-language models (VLMs) remains underexplored. Unlike language models, VLMs combine a language backbone with visual components, which makes unlearning more complex. There is a surprising phenomenon when moving from single-modality unlearning to VLM unlearning: a target forgotten by the standalone language backbone can still be recovered when image information is given to the full VLM. This shows that text-only feedback is not enough for reliable VLM unlearning. Motivated by this observation, we propose Stochastic Meta-Unlearning (SMU), a bilevel framework that uses VLM-level feedback to learn an unlearning-ready initialization. In the inner loop, SMU applies a few unlearning steps to the language backbone using text data. In the outer loop, SMU recomposes the updated backbone with the frozen VLM and evaluates forgetting and utility at the VLM level. This design makes the unlearning update aware of the final multimodal behavior, while still keeping the update local to the language backbone. Experiments on two VLMs, two multimodal meme datasets, and three baselines show that SMU achieves the best overall forget-retain trade-off. Compared with the strongest baseline for each metric, SMU reduces average Forget accuracy by 10.52 points and improves average Retain and Test accuracy by 20.10 and 17.01 points, respectively. More importantly, SMU also transfers to new forgetting targets and to different meta-test unlearning methods. These results suggest that VLM-level feedback can make language-backbone unlearning more reliable and more transferable for VLMs.
Zijie Liu, Jinhao Duan, Gaowen Liu et al.· arXiv.org· 0 citations
Large language models are increasingly deployed through agent harnesses that manage tools, extensions, persistent state, permissions, and external actions. Existing safety benchmarks mainly target individual attack mechanisms or a limited subset of operational settings, making it difficult to compare how safety failures emerge across different harness responsibilities. We present HarnessRisk, a lifecycle oriented benchmark that organizes agent harness safety into six operational phases including Harness Configuration, Capability Extension, Runtime Operation, State Persistence, Action Control, and Incident Recovery. HarnessRisk contains 128 sandboxed cases, each pairing a benign user objective with an adversarial instruction embedded in an untrusted workflow artifact. We evaluate each trajectory using Utility, Attack Success Rate, Persistence, and Detection. Across three harnesses, six language models, and 14 model and harness configurations, attack success ranges from 12.6% to 80.9%, while Utility remains between 75.0% and 97.6%. Harness Configuration is the most vulnerable phase across all three harnesses, showing that attacks can succeed by altering security sensitive parameters within otherwise authorized workflows. We also find that explicit risk recognition does not reliably lead to safe action, as some configurations detect risks in more than 90% of runs while retaining substantial attack success. These results highlight the need to evaluate agent safety across multiple harness responsibilities and at the level of the deployed model and harness configuration.
Ya Bai, Jinhao Duan, Jie Peng et al.· 0 citations
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