This work formalizes the interaction between AI systems and users as a game with three players: a defender and an attacker that are computationally or informationally bounded, and an AI that provides public advice and is less constrained.
Ida Mattsson, Ratip Emin Berker, Emanuel Tewolde et al.· 0 citations
Modern machine learning models are typically trained on data assumed to be representative of the predictive tasks the model will face in the future, but practical datasets violate this assumption. We focus on outcome-dependent truncation in which an observation appears in the training data depending on its label. Our w...
Itai Zilberstein, I. Anagnostides, Arman Kilic et al.· 0 citations
There has been a surge of recent work on correlated equilibrium concepts in Markov games. However, existing results focus on concepts weaker than normal-form correlated equilibria (NFCEs), leaving open the more challenging question of computing such equilibria, which goes back to the seminal work of Papadimitriou and R...
I. Anagnostides, Constantinos Daskalakis, Gabriele Farina et al.· 1 citation
The complexity of IVF(C)CEs in succinct games, which model more realistic strategic interactions that feature either many players or exponentially many pure strategies, is examined, showing that it is at least as hard as the P-matrix linear complementarity problem, and hence as hard as simple stochastic games.
A novel preference elicitation algorithm for linear utilities that outperforms prior techniques in practice and is applied to heart transplant allocation where a policy must balance competing objectives such as post-transplant outcomes, waitlist mortality, geographic ease, and equity.
Itai Zilberstein, I. Anagnostides, Zachary W. Sollie et al.· 0 citations
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