Multimodal large language models have achieved remarkable progress in front-end web development, generating interactive webpages from multimodal references such as screenshots and interaction videos. However, existing work largely emphasizes visual metrics such as aesthetics and layout similarity, while overlooking the more critical validation of interactive functionality. We present RILA, an execution-driven agent that puts browser rendering in the loop, iteratively editing generated code from runtime interaction feedback. RILA introduces an Action Interaction Verification (AIV) module that replays the reference interaction trajectory on the generated webpage to collect grounded execution-aware observations, and an Execution-aware Rendering Score (ERS) that jointly measures interaction correctness and visual fidelity to guide iterative optimization. We further build an execution-verified data synthesis pipeline that produces diverse, high-quality training data, offering gains complementary to inference-time optimization. On IWR-Bench, RILA consistently improves both interaction and visual fidelity across foundation models. Notably, with our training pipeline, RILA lifts the compact Qwen3.5-9B backbone from 40.40% to 57.52%, surpassing far larger one-shot generators, including the 1T-parameter Kimi-K2.6 (55.61%) and the proprietary GPT-5.5 (55.74%).
Yi-Long Guo, Hanck Chen, Zi-Xiao Ye et al.· 0 citations
Agent benchmarks increasingly evaluate repository editing, web research, terminal use, and long-horizon interaction. Their scores support capability claims only when the evaluation protocol keeps the intended capability necessary for success. Recent reward-hacking benchmarks and system reports show that agents can instead recover public solutions, read evaluation artifacts, infer generator structure, manipulate feedback, or benefit from invalid scoring paths; existing responses do not provide a common procedure for attributing these shortcuts and quantifying their effect across benchmarks. We formulate protocol validity and introduce HackDetect, a post-hoc audit that identifies an exposure, determines how the agent used it, and assesses whether the resulting score is misleading. We quantify score inflation with the Mislead gap, defined as the exploit score minus the intended score. We audit 2,385 traces across 15 agent benchmarks and find evidence of exposures and reward hacking in 67.0% of Frontier Science traces and 66.7% of AutoLab tasks. Across paired comparisons, we measure score inflation of 0.45-1.00, showing that benchmark reports should provide evidence that scores reflect the intended capability.