Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Dominik Karos, E. Lehrer
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Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, P. Hernández, Z. Neeman et al.
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Preprint
Oct 2026
We study the strategic design of learning algorithms in a canonical continuous-time pricing game. We introduce a meta-game in which firms select learning rates for a gradient dynamic, evaluating payoffs as the discounted sum of profits accrued along the entire learning path. We uncover a fundamental dichotomy driven by...
Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Edward Plumb, Clemens Possnig et al.
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Preprint
Aug 2026
While infinitely repeated games admit a rich set of Nash equilibria, finitely repeated games typically have a much smaller and often inefficient one. We show how to enlarge this set using deposits: in each period a player may place a refundable sum with a neutral intermediary, returned when the game ends and forfeited...
Giulio Salizzoni, Domenico Mergoni Cecchelli, Edward Plumb et al.
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