Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents turn generated text into real side effects, so poisoned tool metadata, retrieved pages, memory, and reusable skills can steer the next call. Vetting an artifact before admission does not settle this. A safe variant and a leaking variant can produce the same admission evidenc...
Feng-Peng Li, Qi-Zhou Wang, Yu-Ke Hu et al.· 1 citation
This analysis gives sufficient conditions under which suppression at supervised single-turn contexts yields a bound on multi-turn trajectory risk, and characterizes contraction relative to a base-policy risk budget evaluated on the trained policy's contexts.
Feng-Peng Li, Ke-Mou Li, Qi-Zhou Wang et al.· 0 citations
Pre-training equips large language models (LLMs) with a broad repertoire of behavioral patterns associated with roles, styles, values, and goals. Post-training teaches conditional enactment and makes a helpful Assistant the default, but it does not erase alternative modes from the weights; explicit prompts can therefor...
Ke-Mou Li, Zhuan Shi, Qi-Zhou Wang et al.· 3 citations
Alg is introduced, an end-to-end multi-agent simulacra framework for studying reviewer assignment integrity by holding the conference environment fixed and configuring LLM-driven reviewer agents with honest or collusive policies, and an affinity-guided collusive bidding strategy that uses mutual reviewer-paper affiniti...
Ji-Cheng Zhou, Ke-Mou Li, Kahim Wong et al.· 1 citation
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