Inquiry, understanding, and the value of philosophy
In her article ‘A portrait of understanding as a non-factive state’ Ylwa Sjölin Wirling (2026) argues for the existence of an important but hitherto unnoticed form of understanding that she calls ‘non-factive objectual understanding’ (or NFOU for short). NFOU is the sort of understanding we have when we grasp the range of possible accounts of a phenomena. I agree with Sjölin Wirling that NFOU is real and that it plays an important role in inquiry. However, I have doubts about whether or not it is a form of non-factive understanding, and also about whether it is a form of objectual understanding. Indeed, I suggest that by progressing inquiry and acquiring NFOU we may weaken our objectual understanding of the target phenomenon of inquiry. This is a potentially worrying conclusion for philosophy and related subjects where NFOU is often the best we can hope for.