Skepticism and the “Philosophical” Question: Reply to Arata Hamawaki
Arata Hamawaki proposes that external world skepticism arises from dissatisfaction with the limitations of ordinary epistemic life. He offers a Davidson-style transcendental argument in response, urges that certain views of perceptual knowledge lead to skepticism, and suggests that we can’t properly claim to know there is an external world. I address each of these charges. After reviewing failings in Barry Stroud’s attempt to get skepticism going, I explain why dissatisfaction with the limitations of ordinary epistemic life does not lead to a reasonable skeptical conclusion. The Davidson-style argument is not needed for a satisfactory response. It risks obscuring our epistemic fallibility and vulnerability and perhaps expresses a yearning for more security than we can have. Finally, there is no good argument for the claim that we can’t properly claim to know that there is a world outside of our minds. An appendix addresses considerations about perceptual knowledge.